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SILICOSIS AND THE STATE:
CONFIGURING LABOUR’S INTEREST
AS THE PUBLIC INTEREST
—Shruti Iyer*

This article presents a close reading of several Public
Interest Litigation (‘PIL’) petitions before the Indian Supreme
Court since the 1980s, analysing how the figure of the worker
suffering from silicosis, an occupational lung disease, has
been constructed in judicial discourse. I trace the shifts in
the vocabulary of law which variously constructed informal
workers, exposed to dust in the workplace – first, as a community facing forced working conditions; then, as residents
suffering air pollution; and finally, as victims of a human
rights violation that the state was bound to compensate. This
paper builds on and contributes to existing critical scholarship on PIL in India, and demonstrates how the Supreme
Court has been subject to varying pressures in its decision-making, issuing a confusing range of orders as a result.
I show that these cases represent an important but contested
site of claim-making. Through these cases, this article emphasizes that we can discern the outlines of a broader trajectory
in India – where state responsibility for informal workers has
been negotiated with the identification of informal labour’s
interests with the public interest. I also suggest that the route
these cases have taken might offer us reason to be sceptical
*
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of the promise of the ‘public interest’ for informal workers in
India.
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Poyha padya re apu jeeve hata kaurine,
Poyha kunin re, tharla kun re?
We earned some money by breaking body and soul,
Who gets the money, who gets nothing?
—Bhilala song1
The ongoing epidemic of silicosis in India made international news once:
when the Supreme Court issued a warrant against the Chief of the Central
Pollution Board for contempt of court.2 This order came a decade into an
ongoing public interest case on the conditions of workers suffering from silicosis, an incurable lung disease caused by the inhalation of free crystalline
silica dust, typically contracted from hazardous working conditions. The Court
issued the warrant as pollution control authorities had repeatedly failed to
appear in court to explain what they had done to prevent the deaths of stone
workers from silicosis in Gujarat. This event opens up a series of questions:
what led to the Supreme Court’s interest in silicosis as a matter of public interest? Why was a central state agency summoned before the Court, instead of a
private employing firm or corporation? And, of all state agencies, how was it
that the Pollution Board was summoned and not the Labour Department?
This article traces how silicosis came to be framed in this way, in what
seems a definitive break from the ideas of responsibility at the heart of workers’ compensation legislation and other existing labour law statutes. I follow
how silicosis came to be an object of judicial concern in India, and the shifting
ways in which the Indian Supreme Court has constructed the worker suffering
from silicosis. Whilst there are numerous Indian labour laws that provide for
compensation for occupational disease – such as the Factories Act, 1948 (‘the
Factories Act’), the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 (‘the ECA’), and the
1

2

Amita Baviskar, ‘Contract Killings: Silicosis among Adivasi Migrant Workers’ (2008) 43(25)
Economic and Political Weekly 8.
Rina Chandran, ‘India’s Top Court Issues Rare Warrant in Gujarat Silicosis Deaths Case’
Reuters (20 May 2016) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-mining-silicosis-idUSKCN0YB1IT> accessed 15 September 2020.
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Mines Act, 1952 (‘the Mines Act’)’ – silicosis came to figure in several public
interest cases before the Supreme Court from the 1980s. These cases created a
parallel track of compensation, where one set of workers claimed silicosis compensation from the state as an issue of the ‘public interest’, while others could
reasonably be expected to claim compensation from employers under labour
law. The vast majority of the Indian workforce – over 90% in most estimates
– are classified as ‘informally employed’, that is, without any social insurance,
generally without a contract, and outside the reach of protective labour legislation.3 Advocates for worker welfare were forced to find another way to secure
compensation for informal workers. This was attempted in the Public Interest
Litigation (‘PIL’) cases beginning in the 1980s.
This article examines key moments when silicosis became an object of ‘public interest’ before the Indian Supreme Court. It does so by analysing three different discourses about injury and dust that came to the fore in court cases,
each of which cast the worker in a different light. First, in the 1980s, silicosis
was framed as a question of forced labour practices, linked to debt bondage
and child labour, an issue whose solution required rehabilitation to be funded
by both the state and employers. This interpretation remained in vogue until
the 1990s, until activists and the Court reframed silicosis as an issue of dust
pollution. Here, dust was a ‘pollutant’ and the affected person was the ‘resident’, rather than dust being conceptualized as ‘workplace hazard’ with the
affected person as the ‘worker’. However, the spectre of court-ordered industrial closures, in response to pollution, led several trade unions to file a petition intervening in a case on water contamination, arguing that the Supreme
Court’s attitude ignored the question of workers’ health. This order has been
neglected in existing academic work.4 Therefore, the account in this chapter
relies on the few English language newspapers and non-governmental organisation (‘NGO’) reports that followed the case to show how the Supreme Court’s
compensation order took much initiative on the part of workers’ groups to be
fulfilled.
3

4

Santosh Mehrotra, ‘Informal Employment Trends in the Indian Economy: Persistent
Informality, but Growing Positive Development’ (International Labour Organization 2020)
Working Paper 254 <https://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Publications/working-papers/
WCMS_734503/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 25 March 2021. There are numerous and significant critiques of the formal/informal binary – such as arguments that informality has become
so pervasive so as to render it conceptually useless, and those who argue that the formal and
informal economy are intrinsically connected and not separate. I retain the use of the term
in a limited sense here, using informality as shorthand to simply mean activities that operate
outside the formal reach of protective labour law.
Amita Baviskar, Subir Sinha and Kavita Philip, ‘Rethinking Indian Environmentalism’
in Joanne R Bauer (ed), Forging Environmentalism: Justice, Livelihood and Contested
Environments (Routledge Books 2015); and Nivedita Menon, ‘Environment and the Will
to Rule: Supreme Court and Public Interest Litigation in the 1990s’ in Mayur Suresh and
Siddharth Narrain (eds), The Shifting Scales of Justice: The Supreme Court in Neo-liberal
India (Orient Blackswan 2014). These are examples of writing on the Indian judiciary’s
response to ‘bourgeois environmentalist’ demands made via the PIL.
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The final case I consider is the ongoing PIL of People’s Rights and Social
Responsibility Centre v Union of India filed in 2006.5 I show that this case
cements the shift to human rights language for workers that we witness today.
The National Human Rights Commission (‘NHRC’) became a co-petitioner
and issued recommendations that State governments compensate victims and
their families. This marked a decisive discursive transformation in the way the
law understood silicosis – it refashioned workers suffering from occupationally
caused disease as citizens whose basic human rights are violated. However,
this case too has marked a return to the worry about pollution with the order
of more industrial closures.
An outline of this history tells us several things of significance – first,
that the courtroom has been an important site of renegotiation, where workers’ advocates have developed an argument for state responsibility for worker
welfare. Further, while PIL has been a useful tool for civil society groups to
advance their claims, the role and function of PIL has altered with time. As
Bhuwania observes, the Indian Supreme Court has become “the self-proclaimed vanguard of the social revolution” and, in this, its priorities have
tended to shift.6 By attending to the discursive transformations in these
cases, I aim to show how the Supreme Court has engaged with the question
of informality and dust-related disease over time. Although the broader statutory landscape on occupational health and disease in India informs the Court’s
interventions, I focus here on discursive shifts in case law.
I conclude by situating these cases within broader changes in India’s political economy. The rise of human rights and public interest discourse to advance
worker protection has been concomitant with the Supreme Court’s own role in
dismantling formal labour law protections. PIL has allowed the Court to construct itself as the defender of the vulnerable, rather than defending the rights
of workers as a class, and the framing of labour’s interest as the public interest
might be better understood in this light.

I. ‘DANGEROUS OPERATIONS’:
SILICOSIS AS FORCED LABOUR
A. Background
PIL began to emerge in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the late 1970s
and acquired many of its key characteristics in the 1980s, where it began to
5
6

(2010) 14 SCC 769 (Supreme Court of India).
Anuj Bhuwania, Courting the People: Public Interest Litigation in Post-Emergency India
(Cambridge University Press 2016) 25.
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use the discourse of the ‘people’s will’ in an attempt to secure popular legitimacy after the Emergency years.7 The key procedural innovations of PIL
were invented in the 1980s – the first and most significant of these was that it
loosened rules on legal standing (‘locus standi’), allowing any ‘public-spirited’
person or organization to file a suit on behalf of a general or group interest,
even if their own rights had not been injured. In the landmark case of Bandhua
Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984), the Court also rejected the need to
cross-examine information collected by its amicus curiae, arguing that the
standards of an adversarial trial could not apply to PILs. It pronounced orders
of a policy nature, including ordering stone crushing units to spray water and
install vacuuming equipment to prevent dust exposure.8 This marks an early
and significant intervention that the Supreme Court made via PIL on dust-related illnesses, coming in the context of a case on bonded labour. It also is an
early example of an enduring trend in PIL – cases are frequently initiated ‘suo
motu’, and often the remedies ordered are more akin to court-monitored public
policy projects.

B. The Case
The first significant case dealing with silicosis came four years earlier in
Workmen of Slate-Pencil Industry v State of MP (1980), also probably the first
PIL engaging with health before the Indian Supreme Court.9 It concerned the
working conditions of slate pencil manufacturers in the district of Mandsaur,
in Madhya Pradesh. The case was prompted by local investigative reporting, sparking national front-page coverage of shocking conditions of work.
Newspapers reported that entire villages were losing a generation of male
workers to silicosis.10 The media focused on the scale of death, debt bondage
and the horrors of child labour. They reported that 2,000 workers had died of
silicosis in the last decade, and that the illness was so severe that doctors said
nearly all child workers had developed the disease and would die of it soon.11
According to Saiyed and others, “no [other] single occupation has been the
focus of so much public and Government concern in India.”12

7
8

9
10

11

12

For a full critical appraisal of this history, see Bhuwania (n 6).
Chintan Chandrachud, ‘Structural Injunctions and Public Interest Litigation in India’ in Po
Jen Yap (ed), Constitutional Remedies in Asia (Routledge Books 2019).
Writ Petition (Civil) 5143 of 1980 (Supreme Court of India).
S Dhara, ‘Shop-Floor Safety in India: Report of Public Interest Action’ (1990) 25(47)
Economic and Political Weekly 195.
Amiya Rao, ‘Silicosis Deaths of Slate Workers’ (1980) 15(44) Economic and Political Weekly
1883.
HN Saiyed and others, ‘Silicosis in Slate Pencil Workers: I. An Environmental and Medical
Study’ (1985) 8(2) American Journal of Industrial Medicine 127, 128.
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This led lawyers and trade unionists to act publicly and move the Supreme
Court with a writ petition. They applied for the judicial enforcement of fundamental rights under the powers of the Supreme Court. The writ said:
The workmen may have no right to be employed by the manufacturers but once they are employed, they have the right to
work under just and humane conditions and cannot be forced
by economic necessity to work under conditions hazardous
to their lives in violation of their fundamental rights under
Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.13
This construction of Article 19(1)(g) by the petitioner is worth considering.
The constitutional proviso is framed merely as a ‘negative’ right, guaranteeing
the freedom of every individual to practice any lawful profession or trade. In
this era, several fundamental rights against coercion were expanded to encompass ‘positive rights’ to social and economic justice, marking the beginning
of more creative interpretations of the Constitution to advance the cause of
labour.14
The second argument articulated in the writ petition was that the government failed in its responsibility to enforce the Factories Act, which safeguarded
the health and safety of workers and prohibited child labour. This vocabulary
of claim-making is also worth considering in greater depth. Rao wrote, “So
powerful are these manufacturers that the government has not once enforced
the Factory Act though it is fairly well known that the employers have been
violating every one of the minimum requirements regarding health, safety and
general welfare of the workers.”15 While this argument could have been used to
elaborate the ‘horizontality’ of fundamental rights – that is, holding fundamental rights as equally binding on private actors as in individual-state relations
– the logic employed was ultimately to different ends. Fundamental rights were
not called upon to regulate private employers, but rather to argue that “the
state has abdicated these powers and has endangered the lives of the workers
by allowing the manufacturers to continue their operations without any safety
measures.”16 The responsible actor in this framing is the state, and the state
that is called upon to provide relief. Here, we can see how the language of
constitutionalism begins to be used to articulate labour rights as ineluctably
‘human’ rights that are the state’s responsibility to defend, rather than as solely

13
14

15
16

Rao (n 11) 1883.
Gautam Bhatia, ‘The Freedom to Work: PUDR vs. Union of India and the Meaning of
“Forced Labour” under the Indian Constitution’ (2017) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3094640>.
Rao (n 11) 1883.
Rao (n 11).
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private rights flowing from the contract of employment to be enforced directly
against employers by workers themselves.
While the case was being heard, the State government of Madhya Pradesh
passed the M.P. Slate Pencil Karmkar Kalyan Nidhi Adhiniyam in 1982, constituting a ‘Welfare Board’ to provide relief to disabled workers.17 This was not
atypical for the time. Beginning in the 1980s, informal workers in a range of
sectors and States were waging struggles for a Welfare Board that would connect them to welfare and social security without having to prove a relation to
a specific employer.18 This Welfare Board levied a tax on slate pencil manufacturers, creating a group insurance scheme and several other cash welfare benefits for workers.19 Four years later, in 1984, the Supreme Court directed dust
prevention technology to be installed, the government to deal with the compensation cases that had been filed, and the Chief Inspector of Factories to submit
a report on the safety precautions.20 Subsequently, the Madhya Pradesh State
government ordered slate pencil manufacturing to be included as a ‘dangerous
operation’ within the scope of the Factories Act of the State. It also ordered
that, women and children must be barred from stone cutting and carving
work.21

C. The Aftermath
Two years on, Singh’s investigative report claimed that little progress on
these measures had occurred, arguing that it was a “classic example of the
fate of public interest litigation”.22 Factory owners slashed production immediately in response to the welfare tax, even as they continued to refuse to pay it,
despite the commencement of prosecution. Cheap dust prevention technology
had been installed that marginally increased a worker’s lifespan, but that did
not prevent the development of silicosis.23 There has been little reporting on
the issue since, apart from public health journals that have repeatedly found
poor working conditions and high rates of exposure affecting non-workers who
17

18

19

20

21
22
23

Welfare Boards are usually tripartite institutions, collecting contributions from employers in
an industry, workers, and the State government. They allow for informal workers in specific
sectors to access a range of specialised social security schemes.
Rina Agarwala, Informal Labor, Formal Politics, and Dignified Discontent in India
(Cambridge University Press 2013).
The M.P. State Pencil Karmkar Kalyan Nidhi Rules, 1983 (published vide Notification No.
4755-16-13, dated 17-9-1984, M.P. Rajpatra, Part 4 (Ga), dated 8-3-1985) <http://www.bareactslive.com/MP/MP736.HTM>.
NK Singh, ‘Silicosis Cases: Death Continues to Stalk Slate-Pencil Industry Workers in
Madhya Pradesh’ (India Today, 30 September 1986) <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/
nation/story/19860930-silicosis-cases-death-continues-to-stalk-slate-pencil-industry-workersin-madhya-pradesh-801263-1986-09-30> accessed 21 March 2020.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
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live around processing zones as well as labourers themselves.24 There is some
evidence that the Welfare Board continues to be operational, and patients and
their dependents remain eligible for benefits upon producing proof of employment and a certified diagnosis.25 On the other hand, there are reports of widespread deaths in the area and little alternative employment. Public interest in
the fate of slate pencil workers has died down in the last 40 years.26
The use of PIL to advance labour rights already seemed to be limited in
its real-world effects. Progressive court judgements did not seem to translate to either material change or creation of a justiciable right. This case also
demonstrates how the problem of silicosis came to be framed in the courtroom
through discourses that the Supreme Court was attuned to – forced labour and
child labour were two key areas of interest to the Court in its early PIL jurisprudence.27 This case also prefigured a pattern that would become prominent in
later cases – the disappearance of private employers from direct accountability
under labour law for workplace health and safety.

II. ‘A THICK LAYER OF DUST’: SILICOSIS
AS ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD
A. Background
Though the workers in Mandsaur receded from the public eye, the issue
of dust-related illnesses did not disappear from the courts – it merely went
through another configuration. The question of worker health was framed by
the discourse of environmentalism this time. In State of Uttaranchal v Balwant
Singh Chaufal, the Supreme Court provided its own account of the evolving
history of PIL, which it saw as having three phases.28 In Phase I, the Court
was primarily concerned with protecting the fundamental rights of the poor
24

25

26

27

28

LJ Bhagia, ‘Non-Occupational Exposure to Silica Dust in Vicinity of Slate Pencil Industry,
India’ (2008) 151(1) Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 477; MH Fulekar and MM
Alam Khan, ‘Occupational Exposure to Dust in Slate Pencil Manufacture’ (1995) 39(1) The
Annals of Occupational Hygiene 107.
Counterview, ‘Gujarat Govt “Solution” for Workers Suffering from Deadly Silicosis: Go in for
Alternative Job Sources’ (Counterview, 25 June 2014) <https://www.counterview.net/2014/06/
gujarat-govt-solution-for-workers.html> accessed 1 April 2020.
One newspaper article in 2009 alleged that slate pencils are no longer in use anywhere, and
the real purpose of the industry is to act as a cover for opium production and distribution.
See Padma Shastri, ‘A Breathtaking Waste’ (Hindustan Times, 1 June 2009) <https://www.
hindustantimes.com/india/a-breathtaking-waste/story-MNnZwOzE6uFNaIOblRNHRN.html>
accessed 17 September 2020.
Modhurima Dasgupta, ‘Public Interest Litigation for Labour: How the Indian Supreme Court
Protects the Rights of India’s Most Disadvantaged Workers’ (2008) 16(2) Contemporary South
Asia 159.
(2010) 3 SCC 402 (Supreme Court of India).
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and marginalized who were unable to approach the Court; in Phase II, it dealt
with cases related to protection and conservation of the environment and cultural heritage; and in Phase III, it focused on what it calls ‘governance’ issues,
from corruption to public transparency.29 The classic cases of ‘Phase II’ of
PIL, that focused on environmental issues, were largely filed by one lawyer,
MC Mehta, from 1984–85. The Supreme Court continues to hear some of
these cases in what is called ‘continuing mandamus,’ and new orders are still
issued.30 Bhatia remarks of one such drawn-out environmental case, “[e]very
once in a while, the Supreme Court Registry unfreezes [PIL] from its cryostat,
dusts it down and posts it for hearing.”31

B. The Two Cases
The issue of occupational health figured prominently in two petitions of
this period. The first I consider here is the Writ Petition (Civil) 4677 of 1985.32
The case began with a plea for the Court to intervene in the problem of pollution in Delhi, initially focusing on stone-crushing units in the southern part
of the city, Lal Kuan, which emitted heavy dust pollution. MC Mehta claimed
“more than 2,000 tons of dust was being emitted” from the units; a worker
later recalled, “when mining and crushing activities were still going on,
everything in Lal Kuan was covered by a thick layer of dust. Sometimes it was
even hard to breathe.”33 The Supreme Court responded to the complaint that
the stone quarries were causing dust pollution by mandating the closure of 300
stone-crushing units in the Lal Kuan area.34 This caused a complete eviction
of quarry workers from this area. In MC Mehta v Union of India, this was followed by the Supreme Court order that all hazardous industries ought to be
relocated and moved out of urban city limits.35 In this understanding, stone
quarry workers were not workers at risk, but a ‘risk community’ whose health
was in danger from industrial pollution spread by the quarries. In practice, the
industries merely moved to another State.
29

30
31

32
33

34

35

Bhatia argues that there is now a fourth phase of PIL – where the Supreme Court increasingly
attempts to curtail individual freedoms and/or achieve political goals through the use of PIL.
See Gautam Bhatia, ‘The Lawyers’ Collective Order and the Rise of the Fourth-Phase PIL’
(Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 6 May 2019) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.
com/2019/05/08/the-lawyers-collective-order-and-the-rise-of-fourth-phase-pil/>.
Menon (n 4).
Gautam Bhatia, ‘Natural Justice at the Bar of the Supreme Court’ (Indian Constitutional
Law and Philosophy, 5 November 2019) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/11/05/
natural-justice-at-the-bar-of-the-supreme-court/>.
MC Mehta vs Union of India (Writ Petition (Civil) 4677 of 1985) (Supreme Court of India).
SA Azad, ‘PRASAR’s Fight for Rights of Delhi’s Silicosis Sufferers: Grassroot Organization
Improves Lives of Former Stone-Crushers’ (2007) Case Study No 9 Artisanal and Small-Scale
Mining in Asia-Pacific 7; Baviskar, Sinha and Philip (n 4) 197.
Pratik Kanjilal, ‘Closure of Stone Crushers Leaves Labour High and Dry’ (Down to Earth,
30 June 1992) <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/closure-of-stone-crushers-leaves-labourhigh-and-dry-29868> accessed 10 May 2020.
(1996) 4 SCC 351 (Supreme Court of India).
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The shift in judicial discourse that Talib tracks here is one from a relationship where ‘workers’ are owed specific responsibilities, as a result of bondage
or hazardous working conditions, to one where workers are construed as ‘citizens’ living amidst hazardous pollutants.36 Ramanathan argues that some of
this is attributable to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy of 1984, after which the legal
concept of industrial risk expanded to include communities living in proximity
to industry and at risk of exposure to industrial toxins.37 It was partly in line
with this thinking on risk that the Court ordered hazardous factories to relocate, and partly due to the desire to decongest and beautify the capital city for
its middle-class denizens. As a result, industrial relocation meant urban exile
– the workers who inevitably had to travel alongside industry were outside the
scope of the Court’s imagination.
As the Delhi Janwadi Adhikar Manch documented the impact of the orders
on working-class people, a federation of trade unions and human rights groups
banded together to attempt representing their concerns to the Court.38 Baviskar
and others report that when trade unions attempted to be heard in Court:
the judges brushed them aside, merely remarking that the
court would protect workers’ interests and did not need the
intercession of the unions. This verbal assurance was not
recorded as a part of court proceedings, and thus trade unions
were later unable to appeal the judgment, since they had not
been recognized as affected parties.39
Unions and workers’ organizations attempted to problematize the discourse
that framed these industries as illegal and polluting, highlighting that it would
affect the livelihoods of thousands, when air pollution control could just as
easily target vehicular pollution and the consumerist practices of the wealthy

36

37

38

39

Mohammad Talib, Writing Labour: Stone Quarry Workers in Delhi (Oxford University Press
2010).
Usha Ramanathan, ‘Communities at Risk: Industrial Risk in Indian Law’ (2004) 39(41)
Economic and Political Weekly 4521. This was a lethal gas leak that occurred in a Union
Carbide pesticide plant, and one of the world’s worst industrial disasters. It had a significant
impact on the development of health and safety law in India, and has been extensively studied
by socio-legal scholars. See Sheila Jasanoff (ed), Learning from Disaster: Risk Management
after Bhopal (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994); Marc Galanter, ‘When Legal Worlds
Collide: Reflections on Bhopal, the Good Lawyer, and the American Law School’ (1986) 36
Journal of Legal Education 292; Veena Das, ‘Suffering, Legitimacy and Healing: The Bhopal
Case’, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India (Oxford
University Press 1995).
Aditya Nigam, ‘Whose Delhi is it Anyway? The Struggle against a Black Judgement’ (1997)
3 Revolutionary Democracy <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv3n1/delhi.htm>
accessed 8 July 2020.
Baviskar, Sinha and Philip (n 4) 199.
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instead.40 This framing pitted workers’ jobs against the environment. The
Manch later conceded that pollution certainly was an important issue, but its
primary victims were workers themselves.41 Nigam wrote:
[…] as the Delhi Janwadi Adhikar Manch has been arguing,
the way the government and the courts are proceeding, it is
clear that the intention is not to fight pollution. The intention
is merely to ‘get it out of my way’; it is a classic ‘not in my
backyard’ attitude. Simply relocating industries means relocating pollution from the backyard of Delhi’s elite to wherever human life can be found to be cheaper. Did it occur to
the honourable court ever, to ask if whether the pollution that
is choking the city is also affecting the workers employed in
the concerned units? If the answer be yes, then how, may one
ask of the enlightened judges, will they ever be free of the
effects of pollution?42
These pleas had little effect on a Court that had made up its mind – urban
pollution was the ‘public interest’ that had to prevail over the lives of the informally employed working-class.43 Subsequently, in a 1999 order, the Supreme
Court mandated the further relocation of 77,000 ‘non-conforming’ and ‘polluting’ industries in Delhi. The literature extensively remarks on the mass closure of industries in this era as a moment in the neoliberal turn of the Indian
Supreme Court, where PIL became a tool mobilized to articulate the ‘public
interest’ as a fundamentally bourgeois conception of ‘development’.44 Baviskar
describes the environmental PILs of this era as initiatives that constituted a
‘public’ that excludes the city’s poorer sections.45 That was certainly the effect
of this order. Relocation is not a solution for workers, who are either rendered
unemployed or relocate and continue working in hazardous conditions.
However, in 1996, the very same year as the first closures and relocations
of factories in Delhi, the Court issued a contrasting order in a different MC
40

41

42

43
44

45

Delhi Janwadi Adhikar Manch, ‘The Order That Felled a City’ (1997) 32(26) Economic
and Political Weekly 1524; Sanjeev K Routray, ‘Two Kinds of Activism: Reflections on
Citizenship in Globalizing Delhi’ (eSocialSciences, 2013) <https://EconPapers.repec.org/
RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:463>.
Menon (n 4); Gautam Navlakha, ‘Urban Pollution: Driving Workers to Desperation’ (2000)
35(51) Economic and Political Weekly 4469.
Aditya Nigam, ‘Industrial Closures in Delhi’ (2001) 7 Revolutionary Democracy <https://
www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv7n2/industclos.htm> accessed 2 March 2020.
Baviskar, Sinha and Philip (n 4).
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Mehta petition. This PIL, Writ Petition Civil 3727 of 1985, was initially filed
on the issue of water pollution in the Ganges, but the malleable and ever-shifting nature of PIL cases allowed trade unions to effectively intervene in this
petition when they had been unable to in the other one.46 A grassroots science
centre had found cases of silicosis among workers in a quartz powder factory.
Based on this, trade unions in West Bengal, alongside the labour support group
Nagarik Manch, wrote an appeal to the Supreme Court. They argued that:
[e]nvironmental pollution outside the unit and occupational
diseases inside the unit are perhaps two sides of the same
coin. Whereas, the Supreme Court has already most justly
and effectively passed a series of momentous verdicts regarding the “external” environmental pollution, we are keenly
awaiting its verdicts and directives regarding the “internal”
occupational hazards and diseases… 47
This strategy – to use a moment of judicial activism on pollution to establish employer responsibility to workers – appeared to pay off. The Court
employed its ‘epistolary jurisdiction’, where it took notice of letters written to
it, to widen the scope of the environmental pollution case.48 The use of this
tactic by unions was deliberate, as a direct contestation of the Court’s use of
closure orders that disproportionately affected workers. In some ways, this case
represents a reversal of the general trend that Sellers traces, where modern
environmentalism has grown out of the study of workplace hazard.49 In India,
in the 1990s, occupational health inserted itself and grew out of concern for
the effects of pollution on health.
A year after receiving the letter, the Supreme Court ordered the West
Bengal Pollution Control Board to contact Nagarik Manch and locate workers
suffering from occupational illnesses in West Bengal.50 The Pollution Board
confirmed that “a number of workers have died due to environmental pollution […] and some labourers are still suffering from occupational diseases.”51
It is here that we start to see a clear intermingling of two related issues in the
state’s discourse – of dust pollution affecting residents and occupational disease affecting workers – where both are alternately seen as the cause of death
46
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from inhaling hazardous dust. The report also stated that workers feared losing
their jobs if they complained about physical disability: “till date, there is not
a single instance of compensation received by any worker through the normal
course.”52
In 1996, the Supreme Court ordered the West Bengal government to provide “all possible help” to the workmen in the quartz powder factory and also
ordered the industry to respond in court.53 The factory owners denied that the
workers had silicosis, introducing evidence from a doctor of their own that
stated that two victims were in good respiratory health.54 However, the Labour
Commissioner discovered that 16 deceased workers were found to have worked
at the quartz factory, and several workers currently employed in the factory
were also found to have silicosis.55 The Supreme Court ordered the Labour
Commissioner to assess compensation due.56 Here, the Workers’ Compensation
Act became a bone of contention, as it provided no method of calculating
compensation for occupational diseases. Mukul writes that Nagarik Manch
attempted to devise a calculus of compensation, with reference to the average
age of the worker, their dependents, yearly income, and inflation. They arrived
at ₹3,00,000 per worker. The Government of West Bengal contested this,
arguing that compensation should be capped at ₹50,000 rupees instead. The
Supreme Court eventually ordered that factory owners ought to pay ₹1,00,000
to each worker, with an interest rate of 12% per annum if the amount was left
unpaid.57

C. The Aftermath
Despite the low sum, this was a landmark judgment for labour rights in
India – it was the first time that the Court had extended the ‘polluter pays’
principle to include workers suffering from occupational diseases, and the
first time that compensation had been paid to workers in the informal sector,
who were not on company payroll.58 But, for years after the order, there was
no indication that the owners would pay. A Labour Commissioner stated in
an interview: “It is necessary to consider whether it is possible to implement
such judgments. The employer’s capacity to pay should be taken care of. In the
52
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informal sector, it is difficult to pay 1,00,000 rupees in one go.”59 The Labour
Secretary bluntly said: “it is better to work for twenty years and die afterwards
from occupational diseases, than to die of hunger due to the closure of a factory in the name of pollution and hazards.”60
Clearly, paying the compensation sum was not worth the profit margin the
production process earned the factory owners.61 As soon as compensation was
ordered, they were keen to sell the enterprise and handed all assets to the
Labour Commissioner. The owner’s legal counsel claimed that there was simply no money to pay compensation with. Nagarik Manch was forced to conduct investigations on its own to ascertain what their personal assets might
be.62 The petitioners presented in court that one identified owner had several
personal and industrial properties that ought to be attached and sold to pay
compensation. As a result of this pressure and consolidated activity, the first
instalment of compensation was paid in 2001 – 10 years after the first death of
a worker from silicosis in the quartz factory.63
The contradictory outcomes on occupational health in the two different MC
Mehta petitions in the same year allow us to make some important observations about the role of PIL in driving social change. PIL was at a time a device
that could be mobilized by different actors in the Supreme Court, but this
appeared to often be at the discretion of the individual judge, and it was unable to successfully secure its stated ends without a great deal of civil society
engagement. In that sense, it was perhaps a ‘dangerous operation’ of its own
– a gamble that might or might not pay off. It was as likely to run counter to
workers’ rights as to recognize them.
Arguably, these transforming ideas of what the ‘public interest’ is track
alongside broader changes in India’s political economy. Many scholars point
out that in the era following 1998, the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld economic liberalization, privatization, and the displacement of the poor in the
name of ‘development’ while ignoring economic redistribution.64 But this
history can sometimes be harder to delineate in individual cases, even if the
broader trajectory is true. As this article demonstrates, the Supreme Court in
59
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that period seems to have found itself responding to a range of pressures in its
policy-making activity – from the desire to bolster its progressive credentials to
delivering on ‘development’.
In the second MC Mehta petition, which awarded some compensation to the
quartz factory workers, it is equally possible to discern some of the structural
limitations in utilizing judicial activism to enforce labour rights. The Court did
attempt to hold employers liable, but the structure of the industry rendered this
extremely difficult in practice – employers were more willing to wind up operations than pay compensation. I suggest that ‘informality’ is key to understanding this. Small workshops operate outside the scope of the Factories Act and
are often at one end of a long value chain. The fragmented nature of informal
production, small profit margins of owners, and the vulnerability of workers in
sub-contracted work renders the application of labour laws originally designed
to regulate large industrial establishments very difficult.65 This order demonstrates the ‘contingency’ of the human rights approach that was to follow in the
2000s. Employer liability was the path not taken, but not necessarily for want
of trying.66

III. ‘THE MISSING EMPLOYER’: SILICOSIS
AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION
A. Background
In 2003, the stone quarry workers of Lal Kuan featured prominently for
the second time in an expansive PIL before the Supreme Court that is ongoing to this day. This time, however, they figured as victims of a human rights
violation and not as victims of pollution; and this time, the Supreme Court
would find that the state was responsible for compensating them, and not their
employers.
Aid workers in Lal Kuan in the 1990s discovered a high rate of tuberculosis among the quarrying community and, through conversations with medical
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experts, began to suspect that the epidemic was instead one of silicosis.67
They formed an organization, the People’s Rights and Social Research Centre
(‘PRASAR’), to work for the stone quarriers of Lal Kuan. Many had symptoms
of silicosis from past work in the mechanical stone crushing units that had now
closed as a result of the Supreme Court order shuttering the industry. Several
workers had relocated to a neighbouring State to continue crushing stone; others continued manual stone crushing.68 Most were migrant workers, living and
labouring in anonymity:
They are being used as another raw material in all this process of the product making for Country’s growth, development and prosperity. It is worth mentioning here that these
crushers had been shifted here after the Supreme Court’s
judgment with the intention to save the environment of
Country’s Capital. Nowhere does the judgment mention the
safety and health of the workers. Which environment we are
supposed to be saving at the cost of these people?69

B. The Case
While recognizing that it was the Supreme Court’s order in a PIL that relocated industries and caused the spread of disease, PRASAR decided to use
PIL in order to claim compensation for workers. They attempted to lodge petitions with the government on these issues, but when this made little headway,
they “followed the example of the activists in the mid-1980s and brought their
case to the Indian Supreme Court” in 2006.70 Initiating People’s Rights and
Social Research Centre (PRASAR) v Union of India,71 alongside other NGOs
and legal aid groups, their first demand was that the National Human Rights
Commission (‘NHRC’) should ensure that the Ministry of Labour compensates
those affected by silicosis. This marked a discernible shift from 1996 in the
locus of claim-making – from demanding compensation from employers to
demanding compensation from the state. This was not a surprising strategy,
seeing that many enterprises responsible were the same ones closed by the
Supreme Court in 1992 – it was now impossible to demand compensation from
them. Other relocated quarries operated on short-term licences, with workers
67

68

69

70
71

SA Azad, ‘Silicosis amongst the Quarry Workers of Lal Kuan’ (2006) 12 Revolutionary
Democracy <https://revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv12n1/silicosis.htm> accessed 21 June 2020.
Silica-exposed workers are at high risk of contracting tuberculosis, and the symptoms frequently present as those of tuberculosis or other lung diseases.
Gopal Krishna, ‘Succumbing to Stone-Cutting’ (India Together, 2004) <http://www.indiatogether.org/articles/stonecuts-health/print> accessed 1 March 2020.
SA Azad and Ashish Mittal, ‘The Stone Quarrying Industry around Delhi — Impact on
Workers and the Environment’ (2006) People’s Rights and Social Resource Centre 14.
Azad (n 33).
Writ Petition (Civil) 110 of 2006 (Supreme Court of India).

2021

SILICOSIS AND THE STATE

83

brought in on contract and excluded from official payrolls, complicating the
question of establishing workmen’s compensation further.72
After NGOs continued to lobby the NHRC on the question of silicosis, it
became a co-petitioner in the case. The Supreme Court directed the NHRC
to facilitate compensation “through the concerned authorities” to families of
deceased workers.73 The Court also made the Central Pollution Board a party
in the case. This demonstrates that despite the decisive turn to human rights
in this case, the question of dust in the workplace continued to be construed as
a pollution issue. In a review of these cases, the NHRC stated that its position
was:
Once the worker or other person is afflicted by silicosis, it becomes a constitutional obligation on the part of the
Government to take appropriate measures for providing the
necessary health care and rehabilitating the victims. The welfare of workers, especially those in the unorganized sector,
should be given priority.74
The NHRC here clearly articulates an understanding that posits the welfare of labour as a human rights issue. This is a marked contrast to the language of ‘bonded labour’ or of ‘pollution’. Here, the language of rights is used
to demand direct relief from the state. This is a profound shift from the logic
of demanding compensation from private employers. In doing so, it also puts
forth an expansive vision of state responsibility for silicosis on human rights
grounds.
A significant complaint the Court received in this case was on the documented deaths of 238 migrant workers from Madhya Pradesh, who died of silicosis that they contracted from labouring in quartz factories in Gujarat.75 This
raised complex issues of which State authority was responsible for providing
compensation. As far as compensation was concerned, the NHRC’s approach
was to demand monetary relief (in the form of ex gratia payment) from the
State of migration and social security from the State of origin. The NHRC
argued that the State of Gujarat had failed to discharge their constitutional
obligations to workers, as individuals with the ‘right to life’ and health. It also
72
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said, echoing the Supreme Court’s own position on PIL: “The strict principles
of evidence as are applicable to criminal trials are not applicable in the case of
human rights violations when the life of poor labourer [sic] is at stake and his
health is in jeopardy.”76
There was no response from the States for four years, and no payment was
made. The Gujarat government claimed that the Employees’ State Insurance
Corporation (‘ESIC’) ought to bear responsibility instead, as the workers
‘should’ have been insured. Nidhi and Gupta wrote that this was “a classic example of state governments being insensitive to realities.”77 In 2016, the
Supreme Court appeared to lose patience. It ordered that the dispute as to
determining responsibility ought not to delay things further. In the interests
of the kin of those who had died and their ‘orphan children’, the Gujarat government would have to pay compensation immediately. If ESIC were later held
responsible, they could reimburse the State government.78 At this stage, after
repeated non-appearances by the Chief of the Central Pollution Control Board,
the court issued a warrant to secure his presence.79
This demonstrates how the problem of silicosis and workplace hazard was
configured in judicial discourse. State governments were required to provide
immediate relief in the form of ‘compensation’, while pollution control authorities were tasked with inspecting workplaces, implementing pollution control
regulations, and shuttering ‘non-compliant’ industries. In this way, employers
were only conceived of as responsible in their capacity as ‘polluting agents’,
but the state was responsible for the sustaining the lives of communities
affected by workplace disease. This understanding marks a noteworthy change
from earlier Supreme Court decisions on occupational health. For example, in
Consumer Education & Research Centre v Union of India,80 a PIL case filed
on health hazards faced by workers exposed to asbestos, the Court ordered that
liquidated damages must be paid to workers by the factories that had employed
them, even if the claimant had ceased to work there. PRASAR, in this respect,
saw a new reasoning come to the fore.
At the next hearing, the government of Madhya Pradesh claimed that it had
acted to provide benefits to 334 victims of silicosis in two of its districts, but
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the NHRC and NGOs on the ground argued that these were forgeries, and in
fact no steps had been taken. Two workers’ collectives, the Khedut Mazdoor
Chetna Sangathan and the Silicosis Peedit Sangh, submitted counter-affidavits
from affected workers who claimed that they had received no government support. The Supreme Court then ordered the District Legal Services Authority to
ensure that benefits were made available. The Court also ordered the State to
submit reports on their actions at the next set of hearings, saying: “we make
it clear that we are not concerned with any policy framework of the State. The
report is on the benefits which have actually been made available to the victims.”81 In this way, the Court found itself playing two roles at the same time
– ordering the pollution regulators to control for dust prevention, and tasking
State authorities to take ‘immediate’ action to compensate those suffering. It
explicitly took the position of safeguarding the interests of identified victims
who had failed to receive state compensation, rather than taking an interest in
prevention or how the state would compensate and provide for future victims.
Importantly, the compensation paid to workers was ex gratia – a payment
made out of a moral rather than a legal obligation. Ex gratia payments have
a long and chequered history in postcolonial India. In the aftermath of the
Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the Indian government negotiated a paltry settlement with
Union Carbide, and provided ex gratia payments to those affected by the disaster. It continues to pay these to the thousands of people and their dependents
who have now developed cancer, renal failure, and other health issues.82 Ex
gratia payments are also frequently disbursed to people displaced after a disaster, such as a flood or a cyclone, and sometimes to the dependents of farmers
who died by suicide due to debt or drought.83 Ex gratia payments have no legal
force, nor can they be called on as precedent. As Partha Chatterjee argues, the
state cannot render such claims justiciable as it does not have the means to
deliver them to everyone, but at the same time, the state recognises that people can and do make claims of it for welfare which it must accommodate.84
As Veena Das argues, this can be understood as an attempt by the Court to
“maintain and signal legitimacy in the face of massive human suffering.”85
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This is the terrain upon which the state, civil society actors, and those seeking
relief negotiate with one another.
The NHRC stated in a submission to the Parliament:
The most disturbing feature of this problem is that in all
cases, it is the poor labourer working in the unorganized sector who is the victim. The authorities have been evading the
issue to provide assistance to the affected persons [sic]. This
is a highly erroneous view as it contradicts the very spirit of
human rights […]86
Following this order in PRASAR, State Human Rights Commissions were
able to persuade their governments to set aside money for ex gratia compensation for those suffering from silicosis.87
Yet, the most recent order passed in this case, in March 2019, marked a puzzling return to the language of environmentalism. This order framed dust in a
similar vein to the pollution petitions: the petitioners and the Central Pollution
Control Board seemed to agree that action had to be taken to close ‘polluting
units.’ The Court ordered all functioning and non-functioning polluting units
to be closed, as they had “led to serious health problems among the habitants of these areas,” and that the respondent State governments “who allowed
such units to operate should be made to pay adequate compensation to the
victims.”88

C. Aftermath
Here, we find ourselves at the end of a rather strange journey – a petition
that began as a result of Supreme Court-ordered industrial closures ended in
the ordering of more industrial closures across the country. The PRASAR case
has brought together the Supreme Court’s strategies for dealing with occupational illness – ordering industrial closures to prevent pollution and ordering
compensation and welfare benefits to be paid to individual identified victims.
These cases are marked by circuitous forms of reasoning, welding together two
of the most significant discourses of the twentieth century – environmentalism and human rights. They are part of a broader movement, where informal
workers in India have increasingly made the state the target of their demands
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and used human rights vocabulary to make these claims. Informal workers
have used their relation to the state, as citizens and voters, to mobilize for
sectoral welfare benefits, social security benefits, and recognition. These have
often taken the form of demanding the formation of Welfare Boards (for construction and beedi workers nationally, as well as hamal/mathadi workers in
Maharashtra).89
A vast range of PILs have been filed on labour issues in India.90 The Indian
Supreme Court has also regularly used its power to expand the scope of the
case to far beyond the initial issue before it. As we saw, a case can start with
the condition of those suffering from silicosis in Delhi and quickly morph to
considering silicosis everywhere. But these cases, sometimes progressive in
their outcomes, were concomitant with a broader dismantling of formal labour
law protections.91 Singh, after a review of anti-labour judgments made by the
Supreme Court from 1990-2008, concluded despairingly, saying “The judiciary has abandoned the working class.”92 The Supreme Court issued a series
of decisions hollowing out labour law protections, at first without parliamentary changes to the law. It held there was no obligation on employers to hire
contract workers on a permanent basis in SAIL v National Union Waterfront
Workers. It went on to argue that treating casual workers as workers with the
right to permanent employment was to treat “unequals as equals” in State of
Karnataka v Umadevi (3)93 It then held that there is no fundamental right to
strike.94 The judicial interpretation of labour law in this period was broadly
in favour of employers, with the effect of allowing them to access “a set of
workers who can be terminated at will.”95 Some commentators link this jurisprudence of the Supreme Court to the liberalization policies of 1991, arguing
that they paved the way for the acceleration of globalization by weakening
89
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protective labour legislation.96 Baxi would even call the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this time as a form of ‘structural adjustment.’97
Arguably, PIL to defend labour rights has been utilised as a ‘counter movement’ in the Polanyian sense – to blunt the effect of the dismantling of protective labour law and to secure judiciary’s legitimacy.98 The use of PIL by
informal workers began in what Agarwala calls the ‘second wave of legal
empowerment’ in India, which focused on human rights violations that workers face, and was continued in the ‘third wave’, where workers have appealed
for welfare from the state, rather than the implementation of labour laws.99
This general trend towards demanding state responsibility has been developed
partly through the courts, using the vocabulary of human rights and constitutional guarantees. For informal workers affected by silicosis, the new locus of
responsibility for compensation is the state, and the new claimant is the ‘citizen’ as a victim of a human rights violation. This reconfiguring of responsibility is part of a more general development within labour law. Scholars
are increasingly arguing that the normative core of labour rights are in fact
human rights, as worker rights ultimately are rooted in advancing dignity and
freedoms.100
In some respects, the use of individual rights is a strategy uniquely suited
to informal workers who are often unable to prove an employment relationship in court, and who face significant obstacles to workplace organising.
Yadav found, in a survey of quarry workers in Bijolia, Rajasthan that nearly
a third of workers did not know who employed them, and none held a written
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contract of work.101 With the extremely high proportion of informal labour in
India, labour laws that depend on the existence of an employer-employee relationship are under-utilized.102 For example, not a single compensation case was
filed by a mine worker in Rajasthan between 2003 and 2013 under the ECA.103
Further, most Indian labour laws, including the Mines Act and the Factories
Act, exempt small-scale enterprises from registration, which further excludes
informal workers from their scope.104 As informal workers are dispersed across
thousands of working spaces (including their homes) and often work embedded within complex subcontracting arrangements, they face particular obstacles
to unionizing and making demands of their employers. In India, thousands of
informal workers have begun to organize, but they are making demands from
the state for welfare instead.105 The cases we have reviewed here show us the
possibility of leveraging individual rights, and the legal process to make concrete gains for informal workers.
But perhaps the route these cases have taken might also offer us reasons
to be sceptical of the promise of the public interest for workers in India. PILs
have done little to enhance the collective bargaining power of workers as a
whole and have failed to meaningfully grant legal protection to informal workers. The silicosis cases are one example of how informal workers have sought
to use the courtroom to assert their rights as fundamental ones, but they also
demonstrate the limits of such an approach. The state has stepped in to bolster its legitimacy with workers and with capital by providing welfare, but it
neither accepts the legal responsibility to always do so and nor does it invoke
employer responsibility in labour law. This is the sense in which silicosis compensation has been provisioned by the state – always ex gratia. The Indian
informal worker is thus not in a mutual relationship of rights with the state, but
a population to whom benefits and services are provided.106
The use of PIL in these cases also led to wildly different outcomes based
on whose interests the Court sought to defend. As Douzinas wrote, a rights
claim “is the beginning rather than the end of a dispute about the meaning of
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a right or its relative standing vis-à-vis conflicting rights.”107 Since rights are
prescriptions about what ought to happen, one set of rights frequently has to be
traded against another. In the case of MC Mehta v Union of India (1996), was
the right of residents to live in a pollution-free environment more important
than the right to livelihood of workers in polluting industries?108 Was a worker’s right to be gainfully employed more important than their right to a safe
workplace?
In these determinations, the key task that confronts the judiciary is to recognize and delineate both corporate and state responsibilities to labour and
the environment. Yet, despite the existence of protective labour law statutes
in India, this was not attempted.109 The fickle understanding of the disease
in these cases led to the outcome in PRASAR, where advocacy for workers affected by silicosis unable to claim compensation as a result of Supreme
Court-ordered industrial closures has now resulted in the Court ordering more
closures. The erasure of the worker, who is afforded little room to represent
themselves, in PIL proceedings is worrying. This is the case in almost all
instances related to the urban and working poor.110 Even sympathetic scholars cannot help but note that PIL has the overtones of an elite project, and its
critics charge it with being a ‘mobilization from the top’ reminiscent of colonial law.111 PIL has allowed the Court to construct itself as the defender of the
vulnerable, but it is unable to transform socio-economic conditions that would
allow workers to demand accountability from those who profit from their
labour.

IV. CONCLUSION
This article has documented how the emergence of Public Interest Litigation
in the 1980s offered an opportunity for Indian workers and their advocates to
attempt a new route to obtain compensation for occupational disease and illhealth. I traced the shifting discourses by which silicosis was constructed as
a ‘public interest’ issue before the Supreme Court of India. In the first case,
workers suffering from silicosis were seen as citizens working in forced conditions that impinged on their freedoms; in the second, the identity of workers
107

108
109
110
111

Costas Douzinas, ‘Human Rights for Martians’ (Critical Legal Thinking, 3 May 2016)
<https://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/05/03/human-rights-for-martians/#:~:text=In%20
most%20cases%2C%20a%20human,considerations%20unavoidably%20enter%20legal%20
argumentation.> accessed 11 June 2020.
MC Mehta (n 32).
Talib (n 36).
Bhan (n 64); Bhuwania (n 6).
Modhurima Dasgupta, ‘Public Interest Litigation for Labour: How the Indian Supreme Court
Protects the Rights of India’s Most Disadvantaged Workers’ (2008) 16(2) Contemporary South
Asia 159; Radha D’Souza, ‘The “Third World” and Socio-Legal Studies: Neo-Liberalism and
Lessons from India’s Legal Innovations’ (2005) 14(4) Social & Legal Studies 487.

2021

SILICOSIS AND THE STATE

91

was merged with that of residents, understood to be victims of ‘pollution’
rather than workplace hazard; and in the final case, workers were constructed
as victims of a human rights violation. This last understanding placed the
responsibility of compensation on the state, as moral and not a legal obligation.
The development of state responsibility has been influential in the shape that
silicosis compensation has taken in India since. In 2013, the Rajasthan State
government set aside a ‘compensation fund’ to allow workers with silicosis and
their dependents to access benefits – also on ex gratia basis.112 This system of
compensating workers based on a government approved diagnosis is ongoing.113
The understanding that the state is responsible for the condition of those suffering from silicosis marks a significant shift from the traditional emphasis in
tort and workers’ compensation law on employer liability.
This account of PILs on silicosis has described how workers suffering from
silicosis repeatedly figured as victims and not as plaintiffs; as people unable to
prove that they had suffered legal harm, but whose suffering could simply not
be ignored by the legal process.114 There needs to be greater attention paid to
the political economy undergirding this shift, as well as to the sustained dialogue on what these transformations signify. Silicosis compensation has, at the
end of this story, been constructed as a moral obligation as opposed to a labour
law violation. This dissolves the contract between labour, capital, and the state
in labour law by exempting employers from legal liability for workplace safety
of informal workers. These cases serve as an example of a new negotiation on
the boundaries of responsibility of worker health, and the turn to human rights
in such cases may prefigure similar developments elsewhere. It remains to be
seen whether the strategy of state accountability for silicosis can do more for
workers than its alternative.
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